Despite the veneer of agreement, Foucault scholars disagree deeply about where to demarcate the published from the unpublished texts of Foucault. I differentiate four, often tacit, demarcation criteria commonly used by scholars through a survey of the secondary literature (publication, publication*, authorization, and publicness). These demarcation criteria generate different and non-coextensive sets of texts categorized as published. Each of these demarcation criteria are problematized by Foucault's complex publication history. The presupposition that there exists a clear division between published and unpublished texts is a false dichotomy and should be abandoned. Instead, scholars must be explicit about why particular kinds of historical evidence are valuable to their projects and avoid abstractions. This should lead to historically informed methodological discussions with a focus on the material facts of individual texts rather than relying on an abstract and historically falsifiable dichotomy.
"Hence, one may ask: What of Foucault's many modes of publication? Are we to read together or separately Foucault's books, essays, interviews, lectures, prefaces, journalism?"
"The 'no posthumous publications' injunction was once followed faithfully; then interpreted generously; and is now almost completely disregarded."
One of the central problems in philosophical methodology generally is determining the set of texts which are legitimate to use in the pursuit of research. Scholars from a host of different traditions and approaches have radically disagreed about which texts ought to be included in respectable research on any given topic. This equally applies to research on Foucault's philosophy. This disagreement in Foucault scholarship
Scholars make a demarcation between Foucault's published and unpublished work based upon the pre-theoretical background assumptions presupposed by their scholarly projects. Some texts show up as legitimate while others do not. This kind of approach presupposes that within Foucault's writings there exists a system of sorts which could be misrepresented if we do not, as best we can, distinguish between the published and unpublished work.
In Foucault scholarship there is a central argument by which scholars situate their methodology. The argument goes as follows:
P1. There is a sharp and transparent demarcation between Foucault's published and unpublished work.
P2. Foucault's published work should be prioritized over his unpublished work.
P2a. Foucault's unpublished work should not be used.
C. Foucault's unpublished work, if used at all, only functions as a "supplement" for the complete evidence found in the published work.
The first claim is simply assumed as a tacit practice of textual scholarship in general. It can be seen to be assumed and practically implemented, though perhaps tacitly, by almost all Foucault scholars and editors who weigh in on this question. That is, to weigh in on the question of the importance of the published vs. the unpublished work necessitates the assumed existence of a demarcation between the two. The second claim (P2), and its radicalization (P2a), are held, sometimes tacitly, by most editors and many Foucault scholars. Scholars and editors often disagree about claim two and the conclusion but leave the first claim intact. However, I will argue that even though scholars seem to agree about the first claim, their tacit and often unacknowledged demarcation criteria are different. I demonstrate four of these common demarcation criteria (publication, publication*, authorization, and publicness). This means that within scholarly discourse there is not one set of published texts but many unacknowledged sets.
Instead of searching for abstract and universally applicable demarcation criteria, I argue that scholars should instead become more explicit about how their projects presuppose certain pre-theoretical values that allow particular texts to be prioritized. It is at this time, when all of Foucault's notes are in the process of being transcribed by artificial intelligence, that we ought to become clear about these long overdue methodological problems.
The case of Foucault's work is a complex one because of a tension between Foucault's own methodological insights and his final wishes. On the one hand, Foucault is very clear that when we constitute an author's
A collection of texts […] can be designated by the sign of a proper name. But this designation (even leaving to one side problems of attribution) is not a homogeneous function […]. In fact, if one speaks so indiscriminately and unreflectingly of an author's
According to Foucault, which texts are included in an
The establishment of a complete
According to Foucault's own writings, the establishment of an
However, in Foucault scholarship this comes into conflict with the history of Foucault's own life. Foucault was very careful about his public image as an author and exercised a quite stunning and obsessive degree of control over his writings. This was particularly the case when it came to how his work would be treated after his death. Foucault is said to have told his friends, "Don't pull the Max Brod Kafka-trick on me."
In 1977 Foucault told a friend, "When I die, I will leave no manuscripts" and in a letter found in his apartment, written eighteen months before his death, Foucault wrote, "I leave my apartment and all it contains to Daniel Defert. No posthumous publications."
The fact that Foucault suggested that an author's
Foucault was ready to argue that the 'complete works' of Nietzsche should perhaps contain the notebooks in which laundry lists are jumbled up with outlines of aphorisms. He took the view that the same argument did not apply to his own laundry lists. In death, the writer who proclaimed the death of the author continues to exercise authorial rights and privileges.
If one takes Foucault's last wishes seriously, then none of his unpublished works ought to be used. If one follows his writings on method and his approach to Nietzsche scholarship, all of Foucault's work is fair game.
Foucault argues that the use of the term
The first key to understanding why scholars differ so radically is to see it as both a legal disagreement and as a methodological disagreement. As Clare O'Farell argues,
As a number of commentators have observed, these kinds of considerations are particularly pertinent to Foucault's own work […] there have been protracted battles over the status and publication of the typescripts and audiotapes of his lectures and other materials.
These battles have been a matter of legality for Foucault's executors. There have also been parallel methodological battles among editors and scholars. This division between those who use or exclude the unpublished works in Foucault scholarship was aptly summarized by Brad E. Stone. In his 2004 review of Foucault's lectures in
There are probably some Foucauldians who object to the publication of the lectures. Those who take Foucault's final wishes seriously consider the lectures "unpublished" by Foucault, and they should therefore be "unpublished" today, lest one turn Foucault into an author of an
One scholar that holds such a view is Mark G. E. Kelly. Kelly suggests that we ought to prioritize the published works that Foucault authorized over his unauthorized unpublished works generally. He writes,
In the light of all this material of Foucault's that now swirls around us, I think there is some necessity to insist on the privileged status of the material that he actually saw fit to publish, namely Foucault's canonical books and substantial essays published during his lifetime.
Despite Kelly's strong assertion, he is quick to qualify this "canon." He suggests that some material which is not published should not be strictly considered unpublished because it is canonical. That is, although it is unpublished, it should be given privileged status analogous to the published work. He writes,
We could include in the canonical category those talks of his that he allowed to have published during his lifetime, and those interviews of his which he authorized for publication. He insisted on editorial approval for interviews, hence they represent somewhat considered opinions of his, although the questions he addresses are dictated by others. […] [Additionally,] there are some lectures from these series that he did allow to be published during his lifetime (these are, namely, the first two lectures of
Those who hold that Foucault's unpublished works should not be used often appeal to moralistic principles of disloyalty or embarrassment to justify their point. For example, David Macey writes,
The situation created by Foucault is a frustrating one, but it has preempted the emergence of the almost embarrassingly productive postmortem industry that has grown up around Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir as more and more 'unknown' manuscripts are disinterred from various cupboards.
More often than not, these kinds of moralistic ethical objections do not lead to methodological discussions. Scholars simply sidestep these objections altogether. For example, Ben Golder writes, "Putting aside for a moment certain ethical considerations pertaining to the use of this serendipitous
There are written fragments, aphorisms, books, often times that collide and confront each other. We use the terms sloppily, in shorthand. We anthropomorphize the texts or the
Most scholars that take a less radical track tend to begin by defending themselves from a moral objection over the use of the unpublished work. For example, Lynne Huffer writes, "I know that my insistence on citing an unpublished interview Foucault disliked will be seen by some as disloyal or, at the very least, in bad taste. But I see it differently."
So, what we see here is accent to the basic framework of prioritizing the published work over the unpublished work and then making exceptions, or excuses, for why certain unpublished material is acceptable to use. Golder is another example of a scholar who understands the published work as primary while regarding the lecture courses as supplements. He writes,
Frequently they supplement and contextualize some of the better-known formulations which appear in the books, lectures and interviews; and, more interestingly, in places they present examples of Foucault revising or contradicting some of the views expressed in his published work.
Jacob S. Fisher also shares this supplement intuition when he writes,
[…] his
Some argue for this supplemental approach on the grounds of reconstruction. For example, in order to reconstruct Foucault's "Christian book," Jeremy R. Carrette, in the absence at the time of the full published work, puts together a variety of what he calls "fragments." He does this in order to "bring together a selection of central documents, including a course outline, lecture transcripts and published extracts."
These lecture courses are valuable for Foucault scholarship not only because they supplement the arguments given by Foucault in his published monographs during the same period […], but also because there are topics that, although perhaps mentioned briefly or implicitly in the monographs, come to the foreground in the lectures in a way that goes beyond the published texts.
This supplemental approach implicitly accepts that there is a clear and concise distinction between the published and unpublished works. Only after such a demarcation is accepted, these authors argue that the unpublished works should only be used to supplement the published works.
One strand of this line of thinking questions whether or not we ought to constitute Foucault as the author of a published
Yet there is no need to refuse to discuss Foucault as an author of an oeuvre, as some commentators do. Certainly, there are features of Foucault's work that resist defining it as a unified oeuvre. […] However, all such twists and turns can be integrated into comprehensive interpretive schemes.
Some scholars suggest, or simply assume, that Foucault has a single
This quick overview has shown that there are methodological differences within Foucault scholarship even about what texts are legitimate. However, what seems to be clear is that there is almost universal agreement that a distinction between the published and unpublished work is a coherent idea in itself. What we find in practice, however, is that scholars draw this line of demarcation in very different ways based on the needs of their research projects and the tacit demarcation criteria they accept.
In order to explicate some of the problems developed and discussed within scholarship, I will turn to the question of what counts as the published work. When scholars populate the set of text that they categorize as published, they use different criteria and thus generate non-coextensive sets of texts. Since these criteria are often tacit, this allows disagreement to preserve a veneer of agreement. However, the agreement about how to treat the term "published" hides the fact that scholars and editors are using it in several mutually exclusive ways. I will highlight four different ways in which scholars use the term (published vs. published*, published vs. authorized, and published vs. public). All four of these face historical challenges in the publication history of Foucault's work that disrupt their smooth application and use as universal demarcation criteria.
Foucault scholars often use the term "published" in at least two ways that must be distinguished. Some use the term "published" to refer to the works currently available to scholars while others use the term to refer to the work Foucault published during his life. For example, Bernard E. Harcourt states the following in his essay on Foucault and Nietzsche, "I will not discuss the as-yet unpublished manuscripts, remarkable as they are […]. I prefer to leave those manuscripts aside until they are published. Instead, I will focus on those published essays and lectures."
Harcourt is somewhat of an exception in his use of the term "published." Most scholars, when they use the term "published," are referring specifically to the works that Foucault published during his lifetime.
One way the "published" vs. "unpublished" distinction breaks down is through rejections and multiple editions. Although it is hard to imagine today, Foucault's work did receive rejections as any other scholar does. For example, in 1961 Foucault attempted to publish his first work,
Such a history might lead us to think of these as the same published work. However, they differ greatly. The original text, published before its defense at the Sorbonne in May 1961, was a large text of 673 (plus xi) pages and included a complete preface and an appendix only available in this edition. The 1964 edition was a small 308 pages, heavily abridged, and with only a few chapters which were heavily condensed. Foucault eventually disowned the 1964 edition, but it nevertheless became the basis of the 1967 English translation. The original 1964 edition was republished again in 1972. The original text was also reorganized and edited in 1972 when it was eventually published by Gallimard as a 583 page tome. However, the original preface, which was criticized by Derrida,
Which of these texts are we to take as authoritative? One might think, if one tries to follow an author's intention, that if Foucault decided to change what material was included in a text one would have to follow his intentions and ignore earlier editions. If one is focused on history one might suggest that we only make use of those texts that were approved for publication at that time in history.
However, the actual history of Foucault's texts frustrates both methodological intuitions. This is because there are, even if we bracket ourselves to a historical year, multiple simultaneous texts. Since the two texts published in 1972 are not identical, there simply are two separate published texts. Additionally, this is not a singular phenomenon in the history of this text. As was pointed out by Stuart Elden in 2015, in addition to the 1964 abridged version discussed above, Plon also reprinted the original edition in 1964.
As many scholars note, much of Foucault's work was never intended to be published. It was published after his death and against his wishes. However, there are also cases in which Foucault's works were published during his life that complicate the idea that the works Foucault published ought to be prioritized. At least one text was published with Foucault's consent but, because of editorial decisions, that consent and authorization was retroactively withdrawn.
In 1968 Foucault did a radio interview with Jean-Pierre El Kabbach. Foucault asked for certain parts of this interview to be edited and removed before publication. However, the interview was published, unedited, in
The first modification of the publication criteria, as one might expect, is that the publication should also have authorization. When scholars say we should focus on the published works, what they really mean is the authorized works.
One of the first ways the dichotomy of "published" vs. "unpublished" breaks down is between texts that were published during Foucault's lifetime and those that were authorized but not published during his lifetime. Take, for example, the statement made by the editors of
Ten years after Foucault's death, a four-volume work,
Publication of the
In addition to the construction of an
That is to say, some of these texts do not fit strictly into the published category, but because of their clear authorization by Foucault, they were included.
The Foucauldian
The inclusion of authorized but unpublished material has led some commentators, such as Elden, to consider this a "posthumous collection" rather than a "Posthumous publication."
If we are to take "authorization" seriously, as these editors and scholars do, then we are faced with the problem that some texts Foucault authorized to be published, he later disowned or sought to suppress. Foucault tried to have the first edition of his first authored book suppressed later in his life:
One intuitive criteria for prioritizing the published work is that the act of publication implies Foucault's willingness to make that work public. However, Foucault not only communicated with the public through his publications but through a variety of mediums such as interviews and lectures. The etymological origin of "publication" can be traced back to old French "
Gilles Deleuze, who worked with Foucault, captured one of the central questions about Foucault's work; how to handle public interviews. He writes, "
This kind of reasoning has recently also been applied to Foucault's public lectures. The transcribed lectures were, it is argued by editors, made public and therefore cannot be considered unpublished. Stone sets up this disagreement nicely:
Those who take Foucault's final wishes seriously consider the lectures "unpublished" by Foucault, and they should therefore be "unpublished" today, lest one turn Foucault into an author of an oeuvre. The editors write in the preface of all of the lecture course books that the lectures should not be considered "unpublished" because Foucault delivered them in the form of public lectures and, furthermore, the books are not publications of Foucault's lecture notes (although the notes were sometimes consulted); rather, they are transcriptions from audio tapes recorded by students of Foucault.
Further, this is a claim of which Foucault himself was aware. In 1982 Foucault said, "I understand that there are some people recording the lectures. Very well, you are obviously within your rights. The lectures here are public."
Further complicating things, Foucault was often required to publish lecture course summaries, aside from 1983 and 1984, while he was ill, Foucault published summaries of his courses in
The distinction between published summaries, recorded lectures, and lecture notes becomes important in deciding which work is legitimate. Foucault himself threw away much of his own lecture materials. This supports the report of Pierre Nora, who claimed that Foucault said of the material in his lectures, "There is a lot of rubbish, but also lots of work and ways to take it that might be useful to the kids."
What is clear about the lectures, which Foucault had control over, is that he did not intend to publish them. As Mark Kelly writes, "Then we have the lectures series that have appeared only posthumously, which Foucault was confident enough to deliver publicly, and which were based on written scripts, hence were considered, but which he did not deign to publish."
The publication of Foucault's lectures that he did not authorize is often justified by the fact that they were words Foucault himself made public. The editors of the text
This edition is based on the words delivered in public by Foucault. […] Strictly speaking it is not a matter of unpublished work, since this edition reproduces words uttered publicly by Foucault, excluding the often highly developed written material he used to support his lectures.
Many of the posthumously published lectures were based on edited transcriptions of audio recordings made in public. These publications meet the editors own criteria of publicness.
However, recently published lectures do not meet this criteria. In particular, the recently published
Foucault did not present the preparatory manuscript to the public. It was only the oral lecture that was public. As the editors make clear in the introduction to his lectures, his preparatory manuscript was not in a publishable format and was therefore edited. While we can clearly say that the oral presentation was public, we can also clearly say that Foucault's preparatory manuscript was not.
A final example explicates how these demarcation criteria come into conflict. In 1966 Foucault gave a radio broadcast entitled "Utopies et hétérotopies" to
It wasn't until shortly before Foucault's death that he allowed the manuscript of the talk, unreviewed by Foucault, to be displayed to the public at the Internationale Bauaustellung Berlin in 1984.
The editors of
Different criteria include or exclude different documents in the history of this text. According to "publication*," the transcribed excerpts from the lecture would count but the radio broadcast, the public presentation in Berlin and the transcription published after his death would not count. According to "authorization," the publication of the text in 1984 would be acceptable but the radio broadcast, the 1968 publication of excerpts, and the public presentation of the text in Berlin would not count. Under the "publicness" criteria, the radio show and the Berlin piece would count since both were public presentations. Additionally, the transcript of the lectures would also count, but, only after 1984 when it was made public. The texts of the lecture that circulated among the architects after the lecture, however, would not count. This means that even regarding the history of a single work, different criteria demand that scholars work with different texts. These texts vary considerably.
As Kelvin Knight and Vidler point out, the radio broadcast contains different material than any of the published work.
I have demonstrated that scholars often implicitly accept that there exists a clear demarcation between the published and the unpublished work. However, scholars make use of different criteria to justify where this demarcation is made. As I have shown, these all contain historical difficulties such that no single criteria can demarcate all possible historical cases. I have shown that these often tacit demarcation criteria lead to different sets of texts being considered as published.
This should lead us to a central question: Why do we read Foucault and what for? My contention is not that scholars ought to agree on necessary and sufficient conditions of a certain piece of text being part of the published work. I do not think this would be practically achievable given the historical complexities of Foucault's work.
Different projects find different pieces of evidence important. There is no reason to think there should be only one kind of project. I see no reason why a biography of Foucault should be barred from referring to his letters. A work on the history of the publication of Foucault's texts might find the book contracts Foucault signed of immense value. A work on speech writing for public philosophy in France would find the text of Foucault's public lectures of immeasurable value. The point is, that projects frame the kind of methodological concerns which make individual texts valuable. It is perfectly natural that different projects will find different evidence important to prioritize for various reasons. Expecting universal agreement about the value of particular texts would be to make a kind of category error. This is, in fact, one of the ways which Foucault's very analysis of authorship frees us.
However, and I cannot emphasize this enough, I am not saying that facts about the publication history are superfluous. It is an important fact that the interview published in
As scholars of Foucault and Foucault's philosophy, one must admit there is no single unchallenged demarcation between the published work and the unpublished. Each criteria, applied universally, is inconsistent and irreconcilable with historical evidence. Multiple criteria applied simultaneously generates mutually exclusive and non-coextensive sets.
We ought to become explicit about why a piece of text, in its material particularity, is valuable to our projects. In particular, we should follow Foucault's own example when he said of Nietzsche's works that we ought to return to the manuscripts themselves.
For example, we can imagine a project being interested in the philosophy to which Foucault publicly attached his
The failure of the published or unpublished dichotomy to capture the world is demonstrated best by focusing on the rich histories of individual texts as material objects. Consider, for example, that Foucault gave a first edition copy of his
Michel Foucault,
He writes, "For Alain Trutat, because he allowed me to talk about Roussel – with best regards."
An argument can be made that the text originally printed here in the first edition (1963) is published despite the bewildering history of its publication.
The traces of Foucault's work left after his death create a problematic situation. One might think that the source of the problem is only Foucault himself. However, closer scrutiny of scholarly practices in philosophy more generally reveal that this is not an idiosyncrasy of Foucault's life alone. As Foucault himself noted, after editing the complete works of Nietzsche in French, these were also difficulties for editing Nietzsche's work. Foucault's arguments have proven the test of time. The tacit demarcation criteria I have articulated among Foucault scholars are also present among Nietzsche scholars as I have argued elsewhere.
The tacit assumption that there can be a clear distinction between published and unpublished work is not only found in scholarship on Foucault and Nietzsche but is a ubiquitous presupposition within standard commentaries on Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Bentham, Kant, and even Derrida.
A second objection might be that many scholars argue there exists not one Foucault but many Foucaults. One of the freeing things about the ideas expressed in Foucault's texts is that authorial intention and even an author are not necessary for discourse formation. I would readily admit there are many ways in which to read Foucault and, as I have demonstrated in this essay, many ways to demarcate between published and unpublished texts. When we include not only scholarly use, but the varied use of Foucault for artistic and applied purposes these expand considerably. However, Foucault scholars, those interested in interpreting his texts, all admit that there are better and worse ways to read Foucault.
I have argued that the dichotomy between the published or unpublished offers an insufficient framework to answer the question of how we read Foucault. Further, this framework actively conceals the deep methodological disagreements that find their source in tacit criteria that privilege non-coextensive sets of texts. Instead, I argue that by focusing on the values of the projects at hand and the individual texts in question, we can avoid needless abstraction and overgeneralization. We ought to reject any criteria that claims to universally demarcate between the false dichotomy of published and unpublished. Each textual artifact is materially unique and carries the burden of a deep and complex history to which we ought to bear witness in our scholarship. Explicating how we are using particular texts and why those texts are valuable to our particular projects would allow us to avoid historically falsifiable abstractions and focus on the material objects and their history. Let us return, as Foucault himself suggests, to the manuscripts themselves.
Jacob S. Fisher, "What is an Oeuvre? Foucault and Literature,"
Stuart Elden,
By Foucault scholarship I mean those who have a focused research interest in Foucault's writings themselves. That research putting forward an interpretation intended to explicate those texts which might be referred to as Foucault studies. I do not mean those that simply make use of Foucault's work but are not interested in interpreting him (i.e. applied Foucault in criminology or music theory).
It is worth pointing out that Foucault himself thought works could be deformed (
Marie-Laure Massot, Arianna Sforzini, and Vincent Ventresque, "Transcribing Foucault's handwriting with Transkribus,"
It is important to note that this is different from the normative question, "how
Michel Foucault, "The Author Function". Excerpt from "What is an Author?," in
Michel Foucault,
Foucault,
John Forester, "Foucault's Face: The Personal is Theoretical," in
Clayton Koelb, "Editions," in
Clayton Koelb, "Editions," in
Foucault advocated for all of Nietzsche's "
Stuart Elden,
Macey,
James Miller,
Quoted in Miller,
Macey,
Foucault, "Introduction générale," I–IV; Foucault,
Foucault,
Clare O'Farrell,
Brad Elliott Stone, "Defending Society from the Abnormal The Archaeology of Bio-Power"
Mark G. E. Kelly,
Kelly,
Macey,
Ben Golder, "Foucault and the Genealogy of Pastoral Power,"
Bernard E. Harcourt, "The Illusion of Influence: On Foucault, Nietzsche and a Fundamental Misunderstanding,"
Lynne Huffer,
Miller,
Miller,
Miller,
Golder, "Foucault and the Genealogy of Pastoral Power," 158.
Fisher, "What is an Oeuvre?," 279.
It should be noted that
Foucault,
Stone, "Defending Society from the Abnormal," 77.
Jonathan Simons,
Lynne Huffer, "Foucault's Evil Genius," in
J. G. Bird, "Foucault: Power and Politics," in
Micheal Walzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault," in
Mike Gane, "The Form of Foucault,"
David Armstrong, "Foucault and the Sociology of Health and Illness: A Prismatic Reading," in
Bernard E. Harcourt, "The Illusion of Influence: On Foucault, Nietzsche and a Fundamental Misunderstanding,"
David M. Halperin, "Michel Foucault, Jean Le Bitoux, and the Gay Science Lost and Found: An Introduction,"
Pasquale Pasquino, "Michel Foucault (1926–84): The Will to Knowledge," in
It would be interesting to determine whether any changes were made between the submission to Gallimard and Plon.
For differences and speculation about why it was removed see: Deborah Cook, "The Limit of Histories: Michel Foucault's Notion of Partage,"
Sverre Raffnsøe, Morten S. Thaning, and Marius Gudmand-Hoyer,
See for instance Cook, "The Limit of Histories: Michel Foucault's Notion of Partage," 46.
Stuart Elden, "A copy of Michel Foucault's Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique,"
Michel Foucault,
James Bernauer and Thomas Keenan, "The works of Michel Foucault 1954–1984," in
Macey,
Sverre Raffnsøe, Morten S. Thaning, and Marius Gudmand-Hoyer,
Véronique Mottier, "Foucault Revisited: Recent Assessments of the Legacy,"
Derek Robbins,
It is worth noting that
Stone, "Defending Society from the Abnormal," 78.
Elden,
Drew Ninnis, "Foucault and the Madness of Classifying Our Madness,"
Kelly,
It is interesting to note that in Foucault's late work he thought about this explicitly through his work on penance in Tertullian. Foucault suggests that that penance is a kind of showing of oneself, a '
Gilles Deleuze,
Miller,
Michel Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," in
Stone, "Defending Society from the Abnormal," 77–78.
Michel Foucault,
On dis- or a-symmetry, see Foucault's 1975–76 course summary in
Elden,
Pierre Nora, "Il avait un besoin formidable d'être aimé,"
Kelly,
Arpad Szakolczai,
Michel Foucault,
Michel Foucault,
Defert refers to the publication of the lecture of 1970–1971, for which there was no tape, as his "most sacrilegious act" (Daniel Defert, "'I Believe in Time…' Daniel Defert legatee of Michel Foucault's Manuscripts,"
Daniel Defert, "Course Context" in Michel Foucault,
Foucault,
My claim is only that the publicness criteria does not support the editors' decision.
Michel Foucault,
Daniel Defert, "Foucault, Space, and the Architects," in
Macey,
Michel Foucault, "Des espaces autres,"
Michel Foucault, "Andere Räume," in
Michel Foucault, "Des espaces autres. Une conférence inédite de Michel Foucault,"
Foucault, "Of other spaces," trans. J. Miskowiec, 22n1.
Anthony Vidler, "Heterotopias," in
Michiel Dehaene and Lieven De Cauter, "Foreword," in Michel Foucault, "Of other spaces (1967)" in
Kelvin T. Knight, "Placeless Places: Resolving the Paradox of Foucault's Heterotopia,"
Knight, "Placeless Places," 147.
Michel Foucault, "On Nietzsche. Interview with Jacqueline Piatier Translated by Philipp Kender,"
Macy,
Michel Foucault,
"Pour Alain Trutat, puisqu'il permet qu'on parle de Roussel, – très amicalement".
Macy,
I think there is an interesting area to consider audience as a prioritization criteria. This inscription, as well as other documents such as letters, legal documents, and letters of recommendation, are not public however they do have an audience. That audience makes these writings different from Foucault's writing that had no audience at all such as grocery lists. While scholars have commented on "audience" in various ways, to my knowledge it has not been used as a demarcation criteria or consideration, see for instance Nancy Luxton, "Truthfulness, Risk, and Trust in the Late Lectures of Michel Foucault,"
William A.B. Parkhurst, "Does Nietzsche have
The following is not an exhaustive list but hints at how widespread this assumption is: Daniel Garber,
Even if they disagree about which ways are better and which ways are worse.
Foucault, "Introduction générale," II.